Does Duration Vitiate Self-Determination? Autonomy Versus Attrition in Dispute Resolution

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1. Introduction: Autonomy Versus Attrition in Dispute Resolution

Mediation is fundamentally rooted in the principle of self-determination, an axiom that grants disputants power, control, and autonomy over both the resolution process and the ultimate outcome of their dispute. 1 This foundational concept is widely recognized as a cornerstone of procedural justice, which inherently leads to more personalized and durable agreements, fostering higher rates of long-term compliance and participant satisfaction when compared to adversarial litigation. 2

The Definition and Risk of Marathon Mediation

A “marathon mediation” is generally defined by an excessively protracted session, frequently extending well beyond a standard workday, often continuing late into the night. While sometimes necessary for complex cases, this structure can become a mechanism of attrition. 3 When the duration is intentionally leveraged, it risks undermining the core principle of voluntary resolution by replacing genuine consent with overwhelming physical and emotional pressure.

The central legal question arising from these prolonged sessions is whether the resulting physical and emotional exhaustion vitiates the parties’ consent, thereby rendering the subsequent Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA) unenforceable. Challenges to MSAs are typically routed through established common law contract defenses: Duress, Undue Influence, and Lack of Mental Capacity.4 This analysis evaluates if process-induced exhaustion meets the extremely rigorous standards required by courts, which are generally inclined to uphold the strong public policy favoring the finality of settlements. 5

The underlying tension inherent in marathon sessions is the conflict between procedural efficiency and ethical integrity. Practitioners often rely on the momentum generated by intense, long sessions, sometimes bordering on manipulative negotiations to secure a settlement. 6 However, this drive for expediency clashes directly with the ethical imperative of informed, voluntary consent, which requires the mediator to support party self-determination throughout the process. 7

2. Part I: The Contractual Framework and the Enforcement Default

An MSA, once executed, is regarded by the courts primarily as a binding contract. 8 The enforceability and remedial options available upon a subsequent breach hinge on the precise contractual nature of the agreement reached.

MSAs as Enforceable Contracts: Legal Classifications

In analyzing enforcement rights, it is crucial to distinguish whether the agreement constitutes a substituted contract or an executory accord. 9 A substituted contract immediately discharges the original claims upon execution of the MSA. Conversely, an executory accord stipulates that the original duty remains until the terms of the accord are fully performed (satisfied). 10 If a party fails to comply with a binding MSA, the non-breaching party can pursue legal consequences, typically breach of contract claims, or seek court enforcement if the agreement was incorporated into a court order. 11

Formal Requirements and the Intent to Be Bound

For an MSA to be binding, it must satisfy the fundamental elements of contract formation, including offer, acceptance, and sufficient consideration. 12 Specific jurisdictional rules also apply to enhance certainty.

The Necessity of Writing

While common contract law recognizes the validity of oral contracts, provided there was a meeting of the minds on all material terms and a clear intent to be bound, many states and applicable court rules now effectively require a written agreement for mediation settlements. 13 Furthermore, agreements involving specific subject matter, such as the sale of land, contracts lasting longer than one year, or the sale of goods valued at over $500, must comply with the Statute of Frauds, necessitating a written document to prevent fraud or injury. 14

Ambiguity in Future Documentation

The language chosen by the parties regarding future formalization is often critical in determining enforceability. If the parties agree to a settlement “subject to” the execution of a subsequent, more formal document, courts may interpret this as indicating a lack of final intent, potentially leading to denial of enforcement. Conversely, if the agreement is simply “to be followed” by formal implementation documents, courts are generally persuaded that the parties intend to be bound immediately. 15 To avoid expensive litigation over the parties’ intentions and to eliminate costly delays, practitioners consistently recommend finalizing comprehensive settlement documents for immediate execution at the mediation session itself. 16

Judicial Policy Favoring Settlement Finality

The enforceability of MSAs is powerfully supported by a strong judicial policy that favors settlement. The legal system views settlement as essential for democratic self-determination and procedural efficiency, a stance codified by legislatures and favored by common law tradition. 17 Because of this preference, courts often enforce MSAs rigorously and may levy sanctions, including attorney fees and the cost of mediation, against a party attempting to repudiate a finalized settlement. 18

This aggressive judicial support for enforcement establishes a significant barrier for parties seeking to set aside an MSA, particularly those claiming process-induced exhaustion. The judicial position strongly presumes voluntariness and contract validity. Consequently, any challenge based on duress or lack of capacity stemming from a protracted session must present facts demonstrating a fundamental unfairness so egregious that it compels the court to prioritize the sanctity of informed consent over the general policy of settlement finality. 19

3. Part II: The Duress Defense in the Context of Attrition

The central argument against a settlement reached in a marathon session is that the extreme duration created duress or coercion, vitiating the consent.

The Legal Standard for Duress and Coercion

Duress is a contract defense asserting that the agreement was obtained by coercion or intimidation, meaning the party signing was not exercising their free will. 20 Legally, duress requires a serious threat or aggressive action, often unlawful, that overcomes the victim’s independent judgment, thereby negating consent. 21

It is important to recognize that a certain amount of persuasion and pressure is inherent to the mediation process and, arguably, expected by the parties. 22 Mediators often manage expectations, timing, and communication, skills that necessarily involve influencing the parties toward agreement. 23 The line into actionable duress is crossed only when the pressure becomes exploitative, rising to the level where external compulsion extinguishes the party’s autonomy. 24

Protracted Sessions as a Duress Vector

A marathon session can employ exhaustion as a mechanism of attrition, effectively converting the party’s physical and mental state into a vulnerability that the negotiating process or the opposing side can exploit. This amounts to a form of psychological or physical duress by design.

The circumstances often accompanying protracted mediations often align with classic factors cited by courts as indicators of undue pressure:

1. Discussion of the transaction occurs at an unusual or inappropriate time (e.g., late at night).
2. There is an insistent demand that the business be concluded immediately.
3. Extreme emphasis is placed on the untoward consequences of delay (such as imminent trial expense or failure to secure necessary relief).  25

In this context, the pressure exerted by the clock, combined with a mediator’s insistence on concluding the matter, 26 exploits the diminished cognitive state caused by burnout. 27 However, to successfully invoke the duress defense, the challenging party must demonstrate that the opposing party or the mediator actively exploited these pressure factors to induce a settlement known to be unfair or unwanted by the exhausted party. 28 Merely being tired is insufficient; the party must prove that their free will was actively overcome by compulsion. 29

Case Law and the Failure to Meet the High Bar

Despite the considerable number of cases brought by asserting claims of duress following mediation, only in rare instances have courts found these claims persuasive enough to defeat enforcement, even when the underlying facts alleged appear egregious. 30

For a duress claim to succeed, courts generally require proof of external threats unrelated to the negotiation itself or extreme misconduct. For example, a mediated agreement was successfully vitiated where a party threatened to ensure the other party’s incarceration should he fail to settle. 31 Conversely, claims based on generalized anxiety, fear, or emotional distress—even in cases involving a history of abuse—have failed where there was no evidence that a direct threat compelled the signature at that specific moment, indicating that the alleged compulsion must actively overcome free will. 32 Similarly, claims of duress resulting from a long day and pressure exerted by a court-appointed counsel and mediator face rigorous scrutiny. 33

The following table summarizes the legal distinction between standard negotiation pressure and actionable duress in the context of protracted sessions.

Factor	Description	Legal Interpretation in Protracted Sessions
Free Will Overcome	Serious threat or coercion negated consent.34	Requires showing that exhaustion was exploited to enforce an unfair deal, not just that the party was tired.
“Egregious” Facts	Physical threats, explicit abuse of power.35	Must generally exceed mere fatigue; requires direct causal link between coercion and signature.36
Mediator Coercion	Claims that the mediator exerted inappropriate pressure or manipulated the process.37	Courts scrutinize mediator conduct; however, mediators possess broad immunity in many jurisdictions.38
Success Rate	Very rare; high judicial threshold.39	The process must actively extinguish the party’s autonomy,40 not just wear it down.

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4. Part III: Exhaustion and Temporary Incapacity: The Mental Capacity Defense

An alternative, though related, avenue for challenging an MSA reached during a marathon session is the assertion of lack of mental capacity.

The Contractual Requirement of Capacity

For any contract, including an MSA, to be valid, the contracting parties must possess the mental capacity to understand the nature and consequences of the agreement at the time of execution. 41 If a client lacks this capacity, the resulting contract is generally voidable. 42

Incapacity Resulting from Burnout

The argument that a protracted mediation vitiates consent rests heavily on the concept of process-induced incapacity. Severe fatigue stemming from a marathon session can be so intense that it “robs a client of the mental capacity” necessary for rational decision-making. 43

Psychological exhaustion and burnout significantly impair the cognitive functions essential for effective negotiation. These impairments include a reduction in cognitive flexibility, compromised attention and working memory, and difficulties in the regulation of emotional responses. 44 This physiologically diminished state renders the party vulnerable, potentially leading to irrational or deeply regretted decisions made merely to escape the pressure of the moment. 45

The Burden of Proof: Capacity Assessment at Execution

The core legal challenge in asserting this defense is providing objective evidence that the party’s mental faculties were impaired at the precise moment they signed the MSA. 46 General exhaustion or emotional distress is typically deemed insufficient to prove incapacity. The party seeking rescission must demonstrate an actual failure to understand the fundamental terms or consequences of the transaction.

Courts demand objective evidence of incapacitation, often requiring medical testimony or clear contemporaneous observational evidence documented by counsel. The legal analysis often determines whether the party had the capacity to provide proper instructions regarding the proceedings.47 For instance, a court upheld a settlement despite the plaintiff’s claim of incapacity due to side effects from cancer treatment, post-traumatic stress disorder, and grief. The court noted that the initial presumption of capacity had not been sufficiently overcome by evidence directly linking these conditions to an inability to understand the agreement’s terms.48

In situations of extreme fatigue, the line between lack of capacity (inability to understand the deal) and lack of voluntariness (understanding the deal but compelled to sign due to external pressure) becomes significantly blurred. Extreme exhaustion may compel a party to sign merely to secure their release from the negotiation setting. For an incapacity defense based on exhaustion to succeed, the challenging party’s counsel must meticulously record and present observable signs of client decline during the session to establish a clear legal record of diminished capacity.

5. Part IV: Ethical Responsibilities in Managing Duration and Vulnerability

The risk that marathon sessions pose to consent underscores the ethical duties of both mediators and counsel to protect the integrity of the process.

The Mediator’s Obligation to Protect Self-Determination

Mediators are bound by standards of conduct that mandate the support of voluntary participation and self-determination. 49 They must actively refrain from coercing any party to reach a decision or to continue participation. 50 This fundamental duty obligates the mediator to proactively manage the session’s environment to preserve mental clarity and informed consent.

Duty to Provide Breaks and Ensure Basic Needs

When a mediation session is excessively long, the mediator has an affirmative obligation to ensure the parties’ basic physical needs are met, including providing adequate, regular breaks for rest, use of the restroom, and access to refreshments. For parties with disability-related fatigue or other medical considerations, the mediator may need to implement specific adjustments, such as scheduled breaks or modification of meeting times, to maintain the integrity of the process and ensure informed consent. 51

Duty to Terminate or Adjourn Due to Exhaustion, Emotion, or Incapacity

Beyond facilitating breaks, the mediator must be vigilant for signs of burnout, which can manifest in nonverbal behaviors such as low tone, audible sighs, or head shaking, or through verbal expressions of difficulty in understanding options and the process itself. 52 These indicators suggest a potential impairment of critical cognitive functions—including attention, working memory, and emotional regulation—necessary for rational decision-making. 53 When fatigue is so severe that it may “rob a client of the mental capacity” needed to enter a valid settlement, the mediator must pause or adjourn the session until the party’s capacity is assured. 54 If a mediator is spending excessive time attempting to combat intense and raw emotions that derail the negotiation, they are permitted to terminate the mediation, determining that the case is not yet ready for productive resolution. 55

If a mediator perceives that coercion or undue influence may exist, they are obligated to explore the issue privately with the potentially coerced party or, if safety is an imminent concern, to terminate the mediation entirely. 56 Critically, mediators must be alert to “signs of illness, incapacity or incompetence,” particularly in vulnerable parties, and are required to pause or adjourn the session to ensure all parties are present with all their faculties intact before proceeding to settlement. 57 Furthermore, professional guidelines stipulate that a mediation session should not be convened unless “an adequate amount of time has been reserved… to allow the mediation process to be productive”. 58 This guideline requires mediators to proactively manage the duration, recognizing when burnout risks compromising process integrity. 59

Counsel’s Defensive and Ethical Duties

The attorney serves as the primary safeguard of the client’s interests against process pressure and capacity lapses.

Counsel has an ethical duty to prioritize the client’s well-being over settlement momentum. If the attorney believes the client is at risk of substantial harm, such as entering into a damaging agreement due to incapacity caused by severe fatigue, the appropriate decision is to adjourn the mediation immediately and consult with individuals who can protect the client’s interests. 60

Additionally, attorneys have a clear duty regarding informed consent and documentation. They must ensure the client understands the confidentiality implications and the rules governing mediation communication. 61 Moreover, they must guarantee that the client is advised on the legal effect of the signed agreement and, especially if the client is pro se, must be advised to consult an attorney if uncertain of their rights. 62

The following table summarizes the ethical obligations governing session length and party self-determination:

Ethical Principle	Requirement (Model Standards/Rules)	Mitigation for Protracted Sessions
Voluntary Participation	Parties maintain the right to decide participation extent and may withdraw at any time.63	Clearly reminding parties of their right to adjourn, take breaks, or terminate the process when fatigue sets in, ensuring informed consent.64
Avoidance of Coercion	Mediator must refrain from coercing any party to make a decision or settle.65	Exploring perceived coercion privately;66 addressing inappropriate “take it or leave it” demands driven by time pressure.
Assuring Capacity	Mediator must be alert to signs of illness, incapacity, or incompetence.67	If capacity is questioned (due to exhaustion or otherwise), the mediator should pause or adjourn until capacity is assured.68
Process Management	Ensure adequate time is reserved for a productive session.69	Proactively scheduling breaks and considering adjournment before severe burnout sets in.70

6. Part V: Durability, Procedural Justice, and Policy Recommendations

The success of mediation must be measured beyond the immediate settlement rate (which is often high, ranging from 70% to 80%) 71. True success lies in the long-term durability and the high compliance rate of the agreement. 72

The Durability Impact of Coercive Processes

Settlements reached under the duress of exhaustion are inherently fragile. When a party feels compelled to settle due to extreme fatigue rather than rational evaluation, their sense of procedural fairness is eroded. 73 If a party believes the outcome was coerced or unfair, they are far more likely to resent the terms, leading to subsequent breaches, non-compliance, and often new post-settlement litigation, negating the cost and time savings mediation aims to achieve. 74

Policy Debate: The Cooling-Off Period

The persistent difficulty parties face in successfully challenging MSAs based on duress or coercion, coupled with the judicial tendency to uphold finality, 75 has prompted some scholars to propose institutionalizing a mandatory cooling-offperiod following settlement. 76

The underlying rationale is that a cooling-off period would allow exhausted and emotionally drained parties sufficient time to reflect on the agreement away from the pressurized, immediate environment of the mediation. This procedural safeguard would ensure that the settlement truly represents an informed, rational decision, rather than a surrender to exhaustion. 77

Furthermore, implementing a cooling-off period could structurally improve the conduct of mediation sessions. Currently, the marathon session often serves a strategic purpose: leveraging exhaustion to exploit the causal loop where negotiation momentum leads to fatigue, and fatigue, in turn, compromises consent. If the leverage gained by attrition were neutralized by an automatic review period, mediators and counsel would be less incentivized to engage in sessions designed solely to wear down the opposition, forcing negotiations to rely primarily on rational persuasion and objective evaluation.

Strategic Drafting to “Bullet-Proof” the MSA

To mitigate the risk of post-settlement challenges based on capacity or duress, counsel should employ precise strategic drafting when memorializing the agreement.

The most protective strategy involves executing a comprehensive, detailed agreement that resolves all material terms at the mediation, moving beyond a mere term sheet to remove any subsequent ambiguity regarding the parties’ final intent. 78

Additionally, the MSA should be “bullet-proofed” by incorporating explicit clauses or affidavits where parties formally affirm their voluntariness and capacity. These clauses should specifically state that the parties signed the agreement “knowingly and by act of free will,” and confirm their capacity and understanding of all terms, including the waiver of known and unknown claims. 79

7. Conclusion: Balancing Efficiency and Integrity in ADR

The excessively long mediation session presents a critical risk to the integrity of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) by potentially eroding the core principle of self-determination through physical and emotional attrition. While exhaustion is a real phenomenon that can impair cognitive capacity and heighten susceptibility to coercive tactics, the high judicial burden placed on proving contract defenses means that challenges to MSAs based purely on fatigue, absent demonstrable cognitive failure or accompanying unlawful threats, rarely succeed.

The true vulnerability of a protracted session lies not in the successful judicial challenge, but in the compromise of procedural fairness. Settlements secured under the cloud of exhaustion are less likely to achieve the desired long-term durability and compliance rates. Therefore, maintaining the integrity of the ADR process requires that practitioners rigorously adhere to ethical standards regarding duration management, client capacity assessment, and the avoidance of coercion. By prioritizing rational consent over settlement efficiency, the legal system can ensure that mediation agreements remain both binding and truly voluntary.

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Footnotes

1 Robert A. Baruch Bush, The Unfulfilled Promise of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation, 18 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 293 (2018), available at link (last visited Oct. 4, 2025); Cal. R. Ct. 3.853 (stating that a mediator must conduct the mediation in a manner that supports the principles of voluntary participation and self-determination by the parties).

2 A “Party Satisfaction” Perspective on a Comprehensive Mediation Statute, U. Mo. Sch. L. (2007), available at link (reporting that respondents who felt the mediation was fair were more likely to comply and maintain good relations); Anna Krolikowska, Long-Term Success of Mediated Agreements: Key Factors in Illinois, Anna Krolikowska Law (Mar. 28, 2023), https://annaklaw.com/success-of-mediated-agreements/.

3 Bob Arum, The Mediators Speak: Fatigue—Tool or Trouble?, Am. Bar Ass’n (Sept. 15, 2011), link

4 Can a Mediation Agreement Be Overturned in the US? Exploring the Legal Grounds and Process, Resolve Wannon, link (last visited Oct. 4, 2025); Rescission and Set Aside of Family Law Settlements and Judgments: When You Can (And Can’t) Get Out Of A Deal, Hanson Fam. L. Grp., link (last visited Oct. 4, 2025).

5 What Happens After Mediation, Barrett McNagny LLP, link (last visited Oct. 4, 2025); New California Law Requires Informed Consent to Mediation, S.F. Bar (Jan. 22, 2020), link

6 Edna Sussman, ON BECOMING A MORE EFFECTIVE MEDIATOR/NEGOTIATOR, Maricopa Cnty. Superior Ct. (Mar. 18, 2016), link (discussing counsel’s attempts to “game” the mediator and the mediator’s attempts to “manipulate the parties to settle”).

7 G. E. D. T. B. De Jager, Consent in Mediation, CORE 1, 3 (2013), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/144229983.pdf (noting that deepening into mediation provides control over the process).

8 Daniel M. Woska, Mediated Settlement Agreements, State Bar of Tex. (2013), link

9 Id. (distinguishing a substituted contract from an executory accord).

10 Failure to Comply With a Mediation Agreement: Legal Consequences & Next Steps, UpCounsel, link (last visited Oct. 4, 2025).

11 Id. (noting failure to comply can result in breach of contract claims).

12 Woska, supra note 8.

13 When a contract is broken (breach of contract), Cal. Cts. Self Help Guide, https://selfhelp.courts.ca.gov/civil-lawsuit/breach-contract (last visited Oct. 4, 2025).

14 Statute of Frauds: Purpose, Contracts It Covers, and Exceptions, Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/statute-of-frauds.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2025).

15 Edna Sussman, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements, or, When Is a Deal Really a Deal: An Analysis of Murphy v. Institute of International Education, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n (2011), link (discussing the effect of “subject to” clauses).

16 Edna Sussman, Striving for the “Bullet-Proof” Mediation Settlement…, Sussman ADR (2015), link

17 Woska, supra note 8.

18 Id.

19 Jessica W. Young, Mediation Under Pressure: Ethics, Duress & Mandatory Models Across Europe, Glob. L. Experts (2020), link

20 What It Means to Be Under Duress: Undue Influence vs. Duress, Keystone L. Grp., link (last visited Oct. 4, 2025).

21 Can a Mediated Settlement Agreement be set aside for Duress?, Hous. Fam. L. Org., link (last visited Oct. 4, 2025).

22 Sussman, supra note 15.

23 Sussman, supra note 6.

24 Can a Mediated Settlement Agreement be set aside for Duress?, supra note 21.

25 Sussman, supra note 15.

26 Id.

27 Daniel Woska, EDNY ADR Department Columbia Law School Ethics Colloquium Mediation in the Age of Burnout, U.S. Dist. Ct. E. Dist. N.Y. (2024), link

28 Sussman, supra note 15.

29 Can a Mediated Settlement Agreement be set aside for Duress?, supra note 21.

30 Sussman, supra note 15.

31 Mediation Case Law Project 1999-2007 Master List (Sorted by Subject Matter of Case), Mitchell Hamline Sch. L. 3 (2007), link

32 Can a Mediated Settlement Agreement be set aside for Duress?, supra note 21.

33 Mediation Case Law Project 1999-2007 Master List, supra note 31, at 3.

34 What It Means to Be Under Duress, supra note 20.

35 Sussman, supra note 15; Can a Mediation Agreement Be Overturned in the US?, supra note 4.

36 Can a Mediated Settlement Agreement be set aside for Duress?, supra note 21.

37 Sussman, supra note 15.

38 Id.

39 Id.

40 De Jager, supra note 7, at 3.

41 Woska, supra note 8.

42 Jane H. Stansfield, Mediation and incapacity: whether an agreement should be set aside, AustLII (2020), https://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/NSWBarAssocNews/2020/10.pdf (discussing a contract being generally voidable if a client lacks capacity).

43 Arum, supra note 3 (quoting a mediator’s comment on fatigue).

44 Woska, supra note 27.

45 Clemente & Padilla-Racero, The effects of the justice system on mental health, 8009114 PMC (2021), https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8009114/.

46 Determining ‘Legal Capacity’ In Mediation, Mediate.com, link (last visited Oct. 4, 2025).

47 Stansfield, supra note 42.

48 Id. (referencing the court’s finding in a specific case).

49 Cal. R. Ct. 3.853.

50 Id.

51 Questions and Answers for Parties to Mediation: Mediation and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, link (last visited Oct. 4, 2025).

52 Arum, supra note 3.

53 Woska, supra note 27.

54 Sussman, supra note 15 (quoting a mediator’s duty to pause or adjourn if capacity is compromised).

55 Party Foul: Don’t be the Party Who Causes Your Mediation to Fail, Ctr. for Conflict Just. (May 24, 2024), link

56 Minn. Stat. \S 572.37 (2025) (stating the mediator may terminate the mediation if there is a safety concern).

57 Sussman, supra note 15.

58 Md. Standards of Conduct for Mediators, Arbitrators and Other ADR Practitioners \S 2(b) (2018), link

59 Woska, supra note 27.

60 Kenneth R. Hemmer, The Risk of Party Incapacity During Mediation, Hemmer Wessels McMurtry PLLC (Feb. 25, 2020), link

61 Woska, supra note 8.

62 Settlement and Mediation in Landlord and Tenant Court, LawHelp.org/DC, link (last visited Oct. 4, 2025).

63 Cal. R. Ct. 3.853; see also Ethical Guidelines for Mediators Preamble, Tex. Jud. Branch, link (last visited Oct. 4, 2025).

64 Cal. R. Ct. 3.853.

65 Id.

66 Minn. Stat. \S 572.37 (2025).

67 Sussman, supra note 15.

68 Hemmer, supra note 60.

69 Md. Standards of Conduct for Mediators, Arbitrators and Other ADR Practitioners \S 2(b) (2018).

70 Woska, supra note 27.

71 Trends in Mediation, Cin. Bar Ass’n (Mar. 28, 2024), link

72 Krolikowska, supra note 2.

73 A “Party Satisfaction” Perspective, supra note 2.

74 Failure to Comply with a Mediation Agreement, supra note 10.

75 Sussman, supra note 15.

76 Young, supra note 19.

77 Id. (discussing the rationale for a cooling-off period).

78 Sussman, supra note 16.

79 In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio Eastern Division Elizabeth Faye Steele, 2:16-cv-00061 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 18, 2017) (noting the plaintiff’s execution of a release affirming she signed it “knowingly and by act of free will”).